BPSC CCE Mains Answer Writing

Introduction

The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, in force since 31 December 2007, sought to undo the "historical injustice" of colonial and post-colonial forest laws. As of 31 August 2026, about 54 lakh claims have been filed, 80.64% disposed and 25.42 lakh titles covering ~238 lakh acres granted; yet 18.13 lakh claims stand rejected and habitat rights have been recognised for only 11 of 75 PVTGs. The Ministry of Tribal Affairs' regional reviews (Bengaluru, Kolkata, Srinagar, 2026) underline this imbalance.

Why individual rights dominate

• Administrative ease: individual forest rights (capped at 4 ha) are plot-based and fit revenue templates; community forest resource (CFR) rights under Sec 3(1)(i) need mapping of customary boundaries across villages.
• Bureaucratic resistance: forest departments fear losing control over timber, minor forest produce and working plans, as CFR shifts management power to Gram Sabhas.
• Weak institutions: Gram Sabhas and Forest Rights Committees lack awareness, maps and technical support; SDLCs and DLCs are dominated by officials.
• Habitat complexity: Sec 3(1)(e) habitat rights for PVTGs span large landscapes, overlap protected areas and need ethnographic evidence.
• Competing priorities: diversion for mining and infrastructure and conservation-led relocation make states wary of large community claims.
• Political incentives: individual titles deliver quick, countable "beneficiaries".

Democratising forest governance

• Gram Sabha primacy: the Niyamgiri judgment (2013) affirmed the Gram Sabha's role in decisions affecting forest rights; this must become the norm.
• Mission-mode CFR and habitat recognition, following the Mendha-Lekha (Gadchiroli) model of community management and bamboo sales.
• Review of rejections through reasoned orders and re-verification, as UP is doing in Sonbhadra and Chandauli, honouring Sec 4(5): no eviction until verification.
• Convergence with PM-JANMAN, MGNREGA, MSP for minor forest produce and PESA, 1996 to make rights economically meaningful.
• Technology with consent: digital maps should support, not override, oral evidence.

Bihar angle

• Bihar's Scheduled Tribe population is small (about 1.3% in Census 2011) after Jharkhand's creation in 2000, so FRA has received little attention and titles remain very few.
• Tharu communities around Valmiki Tiger Reserve (West Champaran) and tribal and other forest-dwelling settlements on the Kaimur plateau depend on forests for fuel, fodder and minor produce.
• With low forest cover, CFR rights can combine conservation with livelihoods, for example community patrolling and eco-tourism in Valmiki and Kaimur.
• The 75-year proof for other traditional forest dwellers is a major hurdle; documentation drives through panchayats and Jeevika SHGs can help.

Way forward

FRA's promise lies in collective, not merely individual, tenure. Mission-mode CFR recognition, empowered Gram Sabhas, time-bound review of rejected claims and convergence with livelihood schemes can transform forest governance from state control to democratic co-management, balancing ecology, equity and justice.

Introduction

Agrivoltaics means co-locating solar panels and crops on the same land, so that a field produces both food and electricity. Solarisation of agriculture is broader: powering farm operations with solar energy (solar pumps, feeder solarisation) as under PM-KUSUM (2019), and in its extreme form converting farmland into ground-mounted solar parks. The 7th AgriVoltaics World Conference (New Delhi, October 2026) noted that India has 36 operational agrivoltaic projects (37.54 MW) and 10 pilots.

Agrivoltaics vs solarisation

• Land use: agrivoltaics keeps land under cultivation; conventional solar parks remove it from farming, a concern when net sown area is only ~139 Mha.
• Farmer's role: in agrivoltaics farmers remain cultivators and gain lease or power income; land conversion can displace tenants and labourers.
• Ecology: partial shade reduces evapotranspiration and heat stress, saving water, while crops cool panels and raise efficiency.
• Cost: elevated structures and wider spacing raise capital cost compared with ground-mounted plants.
• Grid and scale: solar parks feed bulk power to the grid, whereas agrivoltaics favours distributed generation close to farm loads.

Potential and challenges of scaling up

• Potential: income diversification, climate resilience, decentralised clean power for irrigation and support for India's non-fossil targets.
• State models: Gujarat's Kisan Suryoday Yojana, Maharashtra's Mukhyamantri Saur Krushi Vahini Yojana 2.0 and Karnataka's Surya Raitha.
• Research base: a Centre of Excellence by NISE (MNRE) with ICAR–IARI, including a 100 kW pilot at IARI.
• Challenges: no legal definition or standards on minimum crop yield, panel height or land classification; risk of solar parks being "greenwashed" as agrivoltaics; high upfront cost and weak credit access; fragmented holdings; grid connectivity and DISCOM payment delays; scarce crop-specific shade data; tenancy disputes.

Bihar angle

• Bihar has the highest population density among major states (1,106 per sq km, Census 2011) and tiny average holdings, so diverting farmland to solar parks is socially costly; dual-use agrivoltaics fits better.
• Irrigation relies heavily on groundwater pumping, much of it historically diesel-based; solar pumps and agrivoltaic micro-grids can cut costs.
• Shade-tolerant vegetables, turmeric, ginger and fodder can be grown under panels; flood-prone north and drought-prone south (Gaya, Nawada, Aurangabad) need different designs.
• The state's plan for ~20,000 MW of power for industry over five years, prioritising solar (Bihar Business Connect 2027 curtain-raiser, October 2026), creates space for agrivoltaic, canal-top and floating models that spare cropland.
• Bihar Agricultural University (Sabour) and RPCAU (Pusa) can run crop-shade trials, while FPOs and Jeevika SHGs aggregate small farmers.

Way forward

India needs a national agrivoltaics policy with a clear definition, minimum crop-output norms and design standards; a dedicated PM-KUSUM component with viability gap funding; FPO and cooperative ownership; crop-specific research through ICAR–NISE; and protection of tenants. Done right, agrivoltaics can make the farmer both "annadata" and "urjadata", especially in land-scarce Bihar.

Introduction

UNEP's 17th Emissions Gap Report, "The Point of Return" (October 2026), finds global GHG emissions at 58.4 Gt CO2e in 2025, only 0.1 Gt below 2024. It states that a temporary overshoot of 1.5°C is now unavoidable. Even the lowest-overshoot pathway, requiring cuts of 18% by 2030, 45% by 2035 and 69% by 2040 (versus 2025), implies peak warming of ~1.7–1.8°C and only a ~50% chance of returning to 1.5°C by 2100. New NDCs from about two-thirds of countries cut emissions just 5–8% by 2030.

Key messages

• Ambition gap: pledges fall far short of Paris Agreement (2015) goals, a decade after its adoption.
• Responsibility: the G20 accounts for ~76% of emissions; historical responsibility of developed countries remains central.
• Implementation gap: even current NDCs are not fully backed by domestic policies, so actual emissions may exceed pledged levels, while finance flows to developing countries remain far below their needs.
• Overshoot means more extreme heat, floods and crop losses even in the best case, making adaptation unavoidable.

Implications for India

• Mitigation credibility: India's updated NDC (2022) targets a 45% cut in emissions intensity of GDP by 2030 over 2005 and 50% non-fossil installed power capacity by 2030, the latter achieved in 2025; India can raise ambition while defending its net-zero 2070 pathway and development space.
• Equity and finance: India must press for CBDR-RC, adequate climate finance and technology transfer, given the weak finance outcomes since COP29.
• Sectoral shifts: renewables with storage, green hydrogen, energy efficiency, the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme, agricultural methane cuts and sustainable cooling.
• Adaptation priority: heat action plans, climate-resilient agriculture, flood management and early warning deserve equal weight with mitigation.
• Overshoot debates: carbon dioxide removal and solar geoengineering need cautious, science-based Indian positions.
• Behavioural change: Mission LiFE can curb consumption-based emissions.

Bihar angle

• Bihar faces a double hazard: north Bihar is among India's most flood-prone regions (Kosi, Gandak, Bagmati), while southern districts such as Gaya, Nawada and Aurangabad suffer recurrent drought; overshoot will intensify both.
• Heatwaves and lightning cause significant deaths, and agriculture-dependent and migrant households are most exposed.
• The Jal-Jeevan-Hariyali Abhiyan (2019) on water conservation and greening, and the State Action Plan on Climate Change, form the base for adaptation; Bihar has also prepared a climate-resilient, low-carbon development strategy with UNEP support.
• Opportunities: solar priority in the proposed 20,000 MW industrial power plan, climate-smart agriculture under the Agriculture Road Map, and flood forecasting cooperation with Nepal.

Way forward

India should treat overshoot as a call for both ambition and resilience: a stronger 2035 NDC linked to finance, a national adaptation plan with state-level budgets, and leadership through the International Solar Alliance and the Global South. For Bihar, mainstreaming climate risk into planning is no longer optional.

Introduction

The National Statistical Office (MoSPI) will redesign the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS, launched April 2017) from January 2027 to capture digital-platform (gig) workers and unpaid household and care work such as cooking, cleaning, childcare and elder care. A new second-stage stratum will cover households with at least one platform worker. This addresses two long-standing blind spots in India's labour statistics and has deep implications for women and labour policy.

Significance of measuring gig work

• Visibility: platform work in delivery, ride-hailing and home services is growing fast but is poorly captured by conventional "principal status" questions.
• Policy design: the Code on Social Security, 2020 defines gig and platform workers; reliable estimates are needed for social security schemes, e-Shram registration and welfare boards, as under Rajasthan's 2023 law.
• Quality of work: data on hours, earnings, multiple jobs and algorithmic control can inform decent-work standards and minimum earnings debates.
• Youth employment: gig work is a major entry point for young, semi-skilled workers; tracking it helps skilling and urban employment policy.

Counting unpaid care work: the gender lens

• Invisible labour: Time Use Surveys show women spend several times more time than men on unpaid domestic and care work, which is excluded from GDP and labour force participation.
• Explaining low female participation: the care burden, not unwillingness, keeps many women out of paid work; data can guide investment in crèches, elder care and anganwadi-cum-crèche models.
• Gender budgeting: valuing care work supports gender-responsive budgets, maternity benefits and the creation of care-economy jobs.
• Women in gig work: platforms offer flexibility in beauty and home services but also insecurity; disaggregated data can shape safety and social-protection measures.
• Challenges: definitional clarity, respondent recall, comparability with past rounds and the cost of a larger sample.

Bihar angle

• Bihar is among India's largest sources of out-migrant labour; many young men work in other states in construction, factories and increasingly delivery and ride-hailing, so better data can aid portability of welfare across states.
• Women's participation in paid work in Bihar is among the lowest in India, while their unpaid care and farm work, magnified by male out-migration, remains uncounted.
• Jeevika, with over one crore women in self-help groups, shows how collectivisation can convert unpaid labour into livelihoods; PLFS data can sharpen such programmes.
• Bihar was the first state to reserve 50% of panchayat seats for women (2006) and provides 35% reservation for women in state government jobs; care infrastructure would complement this political and economic empowerment.

Way forward

The revamp should be backed by regular Time Use Surveys, state-level estimates, satellite accounts valuing care work and integration with e-Shram. Translating data into a national care policy, universal social security for platform workers and state-specific migrant welfare frameworks will make labour policy truly inclusive and gender-just.

Introduction

On 23 October 2026, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh released the Indian Army's Land Warfare Doctrine at the Army Commanders' Conference in New Delhi, urging a 20–30-year strategic vision with flexibility and lauding the forces for Operation Sindoor (May 2025). The doctrine comes amid two-front challenges, grey-zone tactics and rapid technological change that are reshaping how land wars are fought.

Changing character of land warfare

• Multi-domain battlefield: land operations now integrate air, cyber, space, electromagnetic and information domains.
• Precision and drones: Operation Sindoor and recent conflicts in Europe and West Asia show the power of drones, loitering munitions, long-range fires and counter-drone systems.
• Grey-zone and hybrid threats: incremental pressure along the LAC, cross-border terrorism and disinformation campaigns.
• Short, intense wars under a nuclear overhang, demanding speed, precision and escalation control.
• Information and narrative warfare: social media and deepfakes can shape domestic and international opinion during conflict, making strategic communication part of operations.

Key requirements

• Jointness: theatre commands, integrated logistics, common communication networks and joint training, driven by the CDS and the Department of Military Affairs.
• Technology: AI-enabled decision support, ISR satellites, drones and counter-drones, electronic warfare, secure networks and space assets.
• Atmanirbharta: indigenous platforms, private industry and start-ups (iDEX), positive indigenisation lists and defence corridors in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.
• Force structure: leaner, agile integrated battle groups and a better balance between manpower costs and modernisation budgets.
• Two-front preparedness: credible deterrence along both western and northern borders, with rapid redeployment capability and integrated air defence.
• Infrastructure and logistics: border roads, tunnels and forward airfields along the northern borders.
• Human capital: tech-savvy soldiers, leadership training, civil–military fusion and resilient morale.
• Long-term vision: 20–30-year capability planning with flexibility, so procurement is not hostage to short budget cycles.

Bihar angle

• Bihar has a proud martial tradition: the Bihar Regiment, with its Regimental Centre at Danapur (Patna), distinguished itself in Kargil and at Galwan (2020), where Colonel B. Santosh Babu of 16 Bihar led his troops.
• Ordnance Factory Nalanda at Rajgir, set up for bi-modular charges for artillery, links Bihar to defence-industrial self-reliance.
• A large youth population makes Bihar a key recruitment base, including Agniveers; skilling and post-service absorption are important.
• Strategic geography: proximity to Nepal and the Siliguri corridor gives Bihar importance for logistics, border management by the SSB and Army-led disaster response, as in Kosi floods.

Way forward

The doctrine must be translated into joint theatre structures, sustained capital budgets, indigenous technology ecosystems and human-capital reforms. Regular doctrinal review, wargaming and lessons from Operation Sindoor should keep it adaptive. A flexible 20–30-year vision will prepare India for short, intense, technology-driven wars while deterring adversaries on two fronts and safeguarding national interests.

Introduction

EAM S. Jaishankar's visit to Baku, the first bilateral visit by an Indian External Affairs Minister to Azerbaijan in eight years, included talks with President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov on trade, energy, connectivity and tourism. It is seen as a reset after Azerbaijan criticised India's Operation Sindoor (May 2025). India also backed the Azerbaijan–Armenia peace process.

India's interests in the South Caucasus and Caspian

• Connectivity: Azerbaijan lies on the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) linking India via Iran to Russia and Europe; a stable Azerbaijan route complements Chabahar and cuts transit time and cost.
• Energy: Azerbaijan supplies crude oil to India, and ONGC Videsh holds stakes in Caspian oilfields and the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, aiding supply diversification.
• Trade and investment: pharmaceuticals, rice, tea and IT, with growing potential in tourism as Indian travel to Baku rises.
• Strategic balance: sustaining ties with Armenia, a major buyer of Indian defence equipment, while engaging Azerbaijan; gateway to Central Asia.
• Peace dividend: a durable Azerbaijan–Armenia settlement could reopen regional transport links, including routes through southern Armenia, widening access to Europe and the Black Sea.
• Multilateral profile: Azerbaijan hosted COP29 (2024) and chaired the Non-Aligned Movement (2019–2023), giving it influence among developing countries.

Managing the Türkiye–Pakistan alignment

• Challenge: the Türkiye–Azerbaijan–Pakistan alignment backs Pakistan on Kashmir, and Ankara and Baku criticised Operation Sindoor.
• Decoupling: separate bilateral economic interests from the Pakistan factor by offering Azerbaijan tangible stakes in trade, connectivity and technology.
• Balanced Armenia policy: transparent defence ties with Armenia and support for the peace process position India as a neutral, constructive partner.
• Partnerships: deepen ties with Greece, Cyprus, Iran and Central Asian states, and use INSTC with Russia to give Baku incentives to engage India.
• Outreach: parliamentary, cultural and people-to-people links, direct flights and multilateral cooperation to dilute the Pakistan narrative.

Bihar angle

• Energy security matters for Bihar's Barauni refinery (IOCL), which processes imported crude; diversified sources such as Caspian oil support stable supplies and the state's petrochemical ambitions.
• INSTC-led trade could open Eurasian markets for Bihar's GI products such as Shahi litchi and Mithila makhana, and for its expanding food-processing sector.
• Bihar's Buddhist heritage at Bodh Gaya and Nalanda, along with the revived Nalanda University, are soft-power assets for India's outreach across Eurasia.
• As Bihar seeks investment through Bihar Business Connect 2027, stable energy diplomacy and wider connectivity create indirect gains for industrialisation.

Conclusion

The Baku reset reflects pragmatic, interest-based diplomacy. By linking connectivity, energy and support for peace, while balancing Armenia and countering the Pakistan narrative, India can make the South Caucasus a bridge to Eurasia rather than an arena of hostile alignments, strengthening its strategic autonomy.

Introduction

A Supreme Court bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu has held that private citizens and voters can file criminal complaints against candidates who furnish false information in nomination affidavits under Section 125A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, an offence punishable with up to six months' imprisonment, or fine, or both. The ruling builds on the voter's right to know recognised in the ADR (2002) and PUCL (2003) judgments.

Significance

• Empowering voters: the voter becomes an active guardian of electoral integrity instead of depending only on the Election Commission or Returning Officers.
• Making disclosure meaningful: affidavits on criminal antecedents, assets and education matter only if falsehood carries consequences.
• Deterrence: concealing pending cases or assets becomes risky, nudging parties towards cleaner candidates.
• Consistent jurisprudence: Lily Thomas (2013) ended protection of convicted legislators, Public Interest Foundation (2018) mandated wide publicity of criminal antecedents, and the 2020 directions require parties to publish reasons for fielding candidates with criminal cases.

Limitations

• Mild penalty: a six-month term or fine does not by itself attract disqualification under Section 8, which for most offences requires a sentence of two years or more.
• Judicial delays: trials may outlast a legislator's term, and special courts for MPs and MLAs face backlogs.
• Evidentiary burden: proving that information was knowingly false or suppressed, rather than an honest error, may be difficult for private complainants.
• Misuse: frivolous or politically motivated complaints may burden courts and candidates.
• Root causes untouched: money power, the perceived "winnability" of tainted candidates, weak inner-party democracy and identity-based voting.

Bihar angle

• Bihar's electoral history includes the first reported case of booth capturing (Rachiyari, Begusarai, 1957) and long-standing concern over the crime–politics nexus; ADR analyses have repeatedly shown a high share of candidates and legislators in Bihar declaring criminal cases.
• Bihar also has a rich democratic tradition, from the ancient republic of Vaishali to the JP movement (1974), which an alert citizenry can draw upon.
• The 2025 Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls in Bihar, and the debate it triggered before the Supreme Court, highlighted the need for voter-centric safeguards and transparency.
• Civil society groups, local media and ordinary voters in Bihar can now use Section 125A to scrutinise affidavits on assets, cases and educational claims.

Way forward

• Amend Section 125A to enhance punishment and make conviction a ground for disqualification, as recommended by the Law Commission's 244th Report (2014).
• Ensure time-bound trials through special courts and online cross-verification of affidavits by the ECI with court, income-tax and land records.
• Promote inner-party democracy, transparent political funding and voter awareness through SVEEP.

The ruling is a valuable but partial remedy; cleansing politics needs legislative, institutional and societal reform working together.

Introduction

Union Agriculture Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan launched the nationwide Khet Bachao Abhiyan – Rabi 2026 on 22 October 2026 at Tarawadi (Karnal, Haryana). Running till 30 November, it aims to reach about one crore farmers through ~4,150 teams of Krishi Vigyan Kendras (KVKs) and ATMA, involving 12,000+ scientists and functionaries, to promote soil health, balanced fertiliser use, crop diversification and sustainable farming.

Soil health and fertiliser imbalance

• Skewed NPK use: subsidy design, with urea prices controlled while P and K fall under the Nutrient Based Subsidy (2010), encourages excess nitrogen.
• Declining soil organic carbon and deficiencies of zinc, sulphur and boron lead to stagnating yields and falling nutrient-use efficiency.
• Environmental costs: nitrate pollution of groundwater, nitrous oxide emissions, residue burning and rice–wheat monocropping.
• Fiscal burden of a large fertiliser subsidy and heavy import dependence.
• Behavioural factors: farmers often apply extra urea for quick visible greenness, and dealer-driven advice frequently replaces scientific, soil-test based recommendations.

How the Abhiyan helps and its limits

• Extension at the doorstep: outreach from state to Gram Panchayat level bridges the "lab-to-land" gap.
• Soil-test based advice: builds on the Soil Health Card scheme (2015, Suratgarh) to promote balanced NPK, micronutrients and organic manures.
• Diversification: pulses, oilseeds and millets in Rabi improve soil fertility and nutrition security.
• Sustainable practices: bio-fertilisers, nano-fertilisers, natural farming, residue management and integrated nutrient management.
• Convergence of ICAR institutes, KVKs, ATMA and state departments.
• Limits: a five-week campaign cannot change entrenched behaviour; extension staff shortages, uneven soil-testing quality and weak follow-up may dilute impact, while price distortions remain.

Bihar angle

• Bihar's agriculture is dominated by small and marginal farmers on fertile Gangetic alluvium, yet intensive rice–wheat cropping and imbalanced urea use have caused zinc and sulphur deficiencies in many areas.
• The state's Agriculture Road Maps (the fourth covers 2023–28) emphasise soil health, organic farming and crop diversification, including an organic corridor along the Ganga.
• Floods in the north deposit silt but also cause waterlogging, while drought-prone southern districts need moisture conservation and pulses–oilseeds; advice must be agro-climatic-zone specific.
• Bihar Agricultural University (Sabour), Dr Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University (Pusa) and the KVK network can make the campaign continuous; Jeevika SHGs can promote vermicompost and bio-inputs.
• Rising crop-residue burning in the rice belt of Rohtas and Kaimur makes residue management advice urgent.

Way forward

Make soil testing universal and village-based; rationalise fertiliser subsidies through nutrient-neutral pricing or direct benefit transfer; reward farmers for building soil organic carbon; strengthen extension staffing and digital advisories; and link the Abhiyan with PM-PRANAM and natural farming missions. A year-round soil health movement, rather than a seasonal campaign, will secure Bihar's and India's food future.

Introduction

UN Day (24 October) marks the entry into force of the UN Charter in 1945; 2026 is its 81st anniversary. Signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 by 50 countries, with Poland becoming the 51st original member, the UN has grown to 193 members. India, a founding member, argues that the Security Council, with five veto-wielding permanent members reflecting the power realities of 1945, has lost both representativeness and effectiveness.

Why reform is needed

• Unrepresentative: Africa and Latin America have no permanent seat, and Asia, home to most of humanity, has only China; the Global South is under-represented.
• Paralysis by veto: conflicts in Europe and West Asia show the Council deadlocked by the interests of permanent members.
• Changed power realities: emerging economies contribute substantially to the global economy, peacekeeping, development finance and climate action.
• Legitimacy: decisions lacking broad representation weaken compliance and multilateralism; the Pact for the Future (2024) acknowledged the urgency of reform.

India's claim

• The world's most populous country and a major economy, and one of the largest and most consistent contributors to UN peacekeeping since the 1950s.
• Democratic credentials, responsible nuclear conduct and leadership of the Global South; its G20 presidency (2023) secured permanent membership of the African Union in the G20.
• Eight terms as a non-permanent member, most recently in 2021–22.
• Coalitions: the G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan) and the L.69 group of developing countries, along with support for Africa's Common Position (Ezulwini Consensus).

Obstacles

• Charter amendment under Article 108 needs two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by all five permanent members.
• The Uniting for Consensus group, including Italy and Pakistan, opposes new permanent seats; disagreements persist on extending the veto, and China remains reluctant.
• The Intergovernmental Negotiations still lack a single negotiating text.

Bihar angle

• Bihar's ancient republics such as Vaishali and the global spread of Buddhism from Bodh Gaya and Nalanda symbolise the inclusive, consultative ethos India brings to multilateralism.
• The revived Nalanda University, backed through the East Asia Summit process, reflects India's capacity for multilateral knowledge partnerships.
• The Bhojpuri-speaking Girmitiya diaspora with roots in Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh, in Mauritius, Fiji, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Suriname, strengthens India's ties with small island and Caribbean states whose General Assembly votes matter for reform.
• Bihar's development priorities, such as poverty reduction, health and flood resilience, link it directly to the UN's Sustainable Development Goals, and agencies like UNICEF work closely with the state.

Way forward

India should press for text-based negotiations, align with Africa's demands, build broad Global South coalitions and support interim steps such as restraint on veto use in mass-atrocity situations, while demonstrating responsible global leadership. A reformed Council is essential if the UN is to remain credible and relevant in its ninth decade.

Introduction

Mission Karmayogi, the National Programme for Civil Services Capacity Building (NPCSCB) approved in September 2020, seeks to shift the bureaucracy from "rule-based" to "role-based" governance. At the Capacity Building Commission's "Sadhana Shrinkhala–2026" northern regional workshop in Lucknow (23–24 October 2026), the UNNATI Capability Index was launched to measure the capacity-building progress of training institutions and civil servants. The initiative raises a deeper question: can training build not just skills but values?

Capacity building, ethics and citizen-centricity

• Competency framework: the Framework of Roles, Activities and Competencies (FRAC) covers behavioural, functional and domain competencies, with integrity, empathy and accountability in the behavioural domain.
• Continuous learning: the iGOT Karmayogi platform enables anytime, anywhere learning, supported by annual capacity-building plans of ministries.
• Measuring outcomes: the UNNATI index can foster healthy competition among institutions and states and link training with performance.
• Citizen-centricity: skills in digital governance, grievance redressal, communication and data use improve service delivery and public trust.
• Ethical competence: case-based training on conflicts of interest, discretion and public-private boundaries helps officers resolve real dilemmas.

Limitations

• Training alone cannot change culture: incentives, transfers, political interference and hierarchical work practices shape behaviour.
• Risk of "checkbox" learning: course-completion metrics may replace real competence, and indices can be gamed.
• Values must be internalised: integrity, impartiality and compassion, stressed by the Nolan principles and the Second ARC's report on Ethics in Governance, grow through mentoring, role models and reflective learning.
• Uneven state capacity: state training institutes vary widely in faculty, content and infrastructure.

Bihar angle

• BIPARD (Bihar Institute of Public Administration and Rural Development), Gaya is the state's apex training institution for civil servants, panchayat functionaries and frontline staff; aligning its programmes with iGOT and the UNNATI framework can raise standards.
• The Bihar Right to Public Services Act (2011) and the Bihar Right to Public Grievance Redressal Act (2015) created legal guarantees for time-bound services; capacity building must equip officials to honour these citizen-centric laws.
• The Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009, enabling confiscation of corruptly acquired property, shows anti-corruption intent; ethics training complements such deterrence.
• Large frontline workforces, including panchayat secretaries, teachers, health workers and Jeevika cadres, need role-based modules in Hindi and local languages, given challenges in health, education and disaster management.
• With 50% reservation for women in panchayats since 2006, a large cohort of elected women representatives also needs leadership, public finance and digital training through BIPARD and district-level centres.

Way forward

Capacity building should combine competence with conscience: link UNNATI scores with outcome-based appraisals, invest in state institutes like BIPARD, embed case-based ethics modules, protect officers from arbitrary transfers and use citizen feedback to assess performance. A true "Karmayogi" serves with skill, integrity and empathy.